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1. Introduction 
The exuberant bull stock market associated with the ‘new economy’ and the ‘dot com’ 
boom of the 1990s came into an abrupt halt in early 2000.  Since then, stock price indices have 
fallen and are far bellow the levels they reached in the late 1990s. Economic history provides 
plenty examples of asset price bubbles beginning as early as the seventeenth century1. Apart from 
the ‘internet bubble’, the previous century witnessed two other major episodes of sudden asset 
price reversals after long periods of sustained rises: the 1929 US stock market crash and the 
Japanese experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Both episodes exhibited a regular 
characteristic of asset price boom-bust cycles, that is, the decline in asset prices was followed by 
a slowdown in economic activity as well as increased financial and banking sectors instability. 
Recent work by Detken and Smets (2003) on a large sample of industrial countries indicates that 
the boom phase typically features rising money, output and credit gaps, and low interest rates 
relative to a Taylor rule benchmark. It has been argued that the widespread financial deregulation 
of asset markets that began in the1980s may have contributed to an increase in the frequency of 
such episodes (IMF, 2003). 
As Bordo and Jeanne (2002) point out, during the boom period the domestic private 
sector accumulates high levels of debt on the expectation of further rises in asset prices, whilst 
the assets themselves serve as a collateral. When asset prices fall, the decline in the value of the 
collateral induces consumers to cut back expenditure and firms to reduce investment spending. In 
essence, the deterioration of balance sheets, following large asset price reductions, further 
exacerbates the negative ‘wealth effect’ on spending, leading to additional negative effects on 
asset prices, bank lending and economic output (collateral-induced credit crunch).  In a number 
of articles, Charles Goodhart and Boris Hofmann establish empirically the link between output 
growth, credit aggregates, and asset price movements in a number of major economies2.  A recent 
study by the IMF (2003) analyses the after-effects of sharp asset price reversals and finds that 
equity prices reductions are quite frequent and are associated with heavy GDP losses. In addition, 
Borio and Lowe (2002) stress that swings in asset prices have historically accompanied episodes 
                                                 
1 See Garber (2000) for a discussion on the tulip mania in the early seventeenth century as well as other famous 
bubbles. 
2 See Goodhart and Hofmann (2000, 2001, 2003). See also Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), for a theoretical model that 
exhibits a crucial interaction between collateral values, asset prices, credit and economic activity. Kocherlakota 
(2000) shows that in the presence of credit constraints which depend upon the collateral value, shocks to income may 
be amplified and produce asymmetric effects in that, negative shocks have larger effects than positive ones. 
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of financial instability. In particular, there is concern that asset price boom and busts could create 
systemic financial risk3.  
An important issue related to the above concerns is the establishment of the appropriate 
monetary policy response to asset price fluctuations. Should the central bank care about financial 
instability? Nowadays, everyone recognizes price level stability as the primary objective of 
monetary policy. Indeed, as Issing (2003) emphasizes, price stability and financial stability tend 
to mutually reinforce each other in the long run. However, as the examples of the US in the 1920s 
and 1990s and Japan in the late 1980s demonstrate, financial imbalances may build up even in an 
environment of stable prices (Borio and Lowe, 2002). Exponents of the ‘new environment’ 
hypothesis argue that low and stable rates of inflation may even foster asset price bubbles, due 
e.g. to excessively optimistic expectations about future economic development. Thus, price 
stability is not a sufficient condition for financial stability. If, in fact, financial stability is defined 
narrowly, as the degree of interest rate smoothness in the economy, and not widely, as the 
prevalence of a financial system that continuously ensures the efficient allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities, then a trade-off between monetary (or price) stability and financial 
stability may arise4. 
The monetary policy response to asset price developments can take two forms, either 
proactive, or reactive. A reactive approach is consistent with an inflation targeting policy regime 
focusing on price stability and according to it, the monetary authorities should wait and see 
whether the asset price reversal occurs, and if it does, to react accordingly to the extent that there 
are implications for inflation and output stability. Hence, the reactive approach is consistent with 
an accomodative ex post response to asset price changes. Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) 
simulate alternative variants of the Taylor rule in the context of the new keynesian model with 
sticky wages and a financial accelerator and find that a central bank dedicated to price stability 
should pay no attention to asset prices per se, except insofar as they signal changes to expected 
inflation. They also argue that trying to stabilise asset prices is problematic since it is nearly 
impossible to know for sure whether a given change in asset values results from fundamental 
factors, non-fundamental factors, or both. Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) employ three alternative 
                                                 
3 We should mention, however, that the empirical evidence linking asset price reversals with banking crises is rather 
limited and inconclusive. See, among others, the paper by Vila (2000). 
4 For instance, in the presence aggregate demand shocks, the trade-off derives from the fact that the central bank  
would have to decide to which degree it prefers interest rate stabilisation over inflation and output stabilisation.   
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dynamic general equilibrium models and, in agreement with Bernanke and Gertler, reach the 
conclusion that asset prices should not be included in the monetary policy rule.   
Against this, Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000), using the same 
theoretical model as Bernake and Gertler (1999), claim that “a central bank concerned with both 
hitting an inflation target at a given time horizon, and achieving as smooth a path as possible for 
inflation, is likely to achieve superior performance by adjusting its policy instruments not only to 
inflation (or to its inflation forecast) and the output gap, but to asset prices as well” (p.2). 
Ceccheti et al argue that such a proactive response will reduce the likelihood of asset price 
bubbles forming, thus reducing the risk of boom-bust investment cycles.  Bernanke and Gertler 
(2001) attribute their findings to, among other factors, the use of a misleading metric in the 
comparison between policy rules. 
In this paper we take another look at the interaction between monetary policy and asset 
prices using a small rational expectations model that takes into account the effect of asset prices 
on aggregate demand in order to capture investment and consumption wealth effects. Using 
stochastic simulations, we then examine how inflation, output, interest rates, and asset prices 
behave under alternative policy rules. Our results confirm previous findings by Cecchetti et al 
(2000) in that, macroeconomic volatility can be reduced with a mild reaction of interest rates to 
asset price misalignments from fundamentals. Our main contribution lies in the fact that in our 
simulations we employ two alternative monetary policy rules, inflation forecast targeting, and the 
standard Taylor rule, with the main conclusions for the role of monetary policy with respect to 
asset prices remaining unchanged. We also incorporate an alternative partial adjustment 
mechanism of asset prices towards their fundamental value that allows for both ‘momentum 
trading’ and ‘fundamentals pull’.    
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the 
theoretical model that will be employed in the simulations. In Section 3 we calibrate the model’s 
structural parameters on the basis of previous econometric evidence for the UK economy.  
Section 4.1 presents the results from impulse response analysis, and Section 4.2 compares the 
effect on macroeconomic uncertainty from alternative monetary policy choices. Section 5 
provides conclusions. 
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2. Model  
We use a structural model of the economy that allows for the effect of asset prices on 
aggregate demand and monetary policy. The model augments the standard three sector macro 
model (aggregate demand, aggregate supply, monetary policy rule) by taking into account asset 
prices, which themselves are assumed to stochastically evolve influenced by both fundamentals 
and momentum.   The model is given by the following equations: 
 
1 1 1 1 2 1[ ] ( [ ])t t t t t t t ty E y a i E a qπ η+ − − −= − − + +  (1) 
_
1 1(1 ) [ ] ( )t t t t t t tE y yπ ϕ π ϕπ β ε+ −= − + + − +  (2) 
*
1 1 2 1( )t t t tq b q b q q− −= ∆ − −  (3) 
*
1 1 2 1( [ ]) [ ]t t t t t t tq i E E y uδ π δ+ += − − + +  (4) 
_
* *
4 1 2 3 4 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )t t t t t t t t ti r y y q q iγ π γ π π γ γ γ θ− = − + + − + − + − + +    (5) 
* * *
4 1 3 4 1(1 ) ( [ ] ) ( )t t t j t t t ti r E q q iγ γ π π γ γ θ+ − = − + − + − + +   (5)΄ 
where yt is (log) output, 
_
ty is the natural-rate value of yt , 
_~
t t ty y y= −  is the output gap, 
1t t tp pπ −= − is the inflation rate, pt is (log) price level, it is the monetary policy instrument (one-
period nominal interest rate, e.g. repo rate,  r is the equilibrium real interest rate and π* is the 
inflation target. qt  denotes  (log) real asset prices and qt* the fundamentals. Different 
interpretations of qt are possible (e.g. house prices, stock prices or the value of a portfolio 
containing both housing and equity investment), in what follows though we mainly treat it is an 
equity index. tη , tε , tθ , tu represent exogenous random shocks to output, inflation, nominal 
interest rates and asset price fundamentals. Their innovations are mutually uncorrelated i.i.d. 
processes with zero means and constant variances: ση2 , σθ2 , σε2, σu2.  The natural-rate output, 
_
ty , 
is AR(1) process; its innovation, ωt, has constant variance σω2. The structural parameters can be 
interpreted as partial elasticities with the following properties: 1a , β , 1γ , 2γ , 1δ , 2δ , b1, b2 > 0,  
2a  , 3γ ≥ 0,   ϕ >0, 4γ < 1 .  
Eq. (1) represents the demand side of the economy as an optimizing IS-type of 
relationship where current output depends positively on its expected future value and negatively 
on the lagged real interest rate, 1 1[ ]t t ti E π− −− . The presence of future output in the IS intends to 
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capture the effect of expected income on current spending and is theoretically justified by 
McCallum and Nelson (1999), among others, in the context of an optimizing general equilibrium 
model5.  
Aggregate demand depends positively on the past level of asset prices via consumption 
wealth effects and investment balance sheet effects. For example, a persistent decrease in the 
level of stock prices increases the perceived level of households’ financial distress causing a 
reduction in consumption spending. The balance sheet channel implies a positive relationship 
between the firms’ ability to borrow and their net worth which in turn depends on asset 
valuations.  There is a vast amount of empirical evidence indicating that stock and house price 
movements are strongly correlated with aggregate demand in most major economies6. In our 
model, the central bank takes into account the effect of wealth on aggregate demand, that is, it is 
fully aware of the effect of qt-1 on yt and its magnitude.  
Eq. (2) depicts the price adjustment relation taking the form of a hybrid Phillips curve 
where current inflation is positively affected by its past and expected future value as well as the 
output gap.  Hybrid Phillips curves have been developed in the literature in an effort to reduce the 
inconsistencies between purely forward-looking models and actual inflation data (see e.g. 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999).   
Eqs. (3) and (4) represent the dynamic evolution of asset prices and their underlying 
fundamentals, respectively. We assume a partial adjustment mechanism of actual asset prices 
towards their fundamental value that allows for the appearance of a bubble buildup. As Eq. (3) 
indicates, if asset prices have increased in the past (∆qt-1 > 0) there is a positive ‘momentum’ 
effect on their current level (b1 > 0). The higher the value of b1 the stronger the effect from past 
capital gains/losses and therefore qt can diverge significantly from its fundamental value, qt*, 
albeit not permanently7. But once asset prices revert, at an unknown future date, the downward 
effect on aggregate demand could be large. We allow for reversion to fundamentals since if there 
is an decrease in the fundamentals (qt* < qt-1 ) there is a negative pressure on qt.  The higher is b2, 
the closer will be the co-movement between observed prices and the underlying fundamentals.   
                                                 
5 The expectational aggregate demand equation can be derived from the first order Euler condition for the 
representative household’s optimal consumption choice problem assuming constant relative risk aversion and 
separability between consumption and leisure.  
6 See among others, Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2003) for relevant empirical evidence considering the UK 
economy. 
7 We do not regard the divergence of qt  from qt* as an explicit bubble because we do not assign any probabilistic 
structure to its evolution.  
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 Eq. (4) describes fundamental asset prices in line with the standard dividend model of 
asset pricing. There is a positive effect from expected future dividends (assumed to depend on 
expected output) and a negative effect from real interest rates. This is supported by the majority 
of empirical studies examining the effect of macroeconomic variables on the stock market8. We 
also allow for uncertainty in the fundamentals’ process by including the random disturbance 
term, ut.  
In order to complete the model we need another equation describing the behaviour of the 
central bank. We will consider two types of rules for the period-by-period setting of the monetary 
policy instrument, it . Eq. (5) depicts a monetary policy rule that conditions the interest rate on 
concurrent inflation deviations from the target, the output gap9, as well as on asset price 
misalignments, *t tq q− . If there is no response to asset price misalignments, 3 0γ = , then Eq. (5) 
reduces to the standard Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). In addition, we examine the case of an 
augmented inflation-forecast targeting rule, as given by Eq. (5΄). In pure inflation-forecast based 
rules, 2 3 0γ γ= = , and the only feedback variable for monetary policy is the deviation of inflation 
forecast from the target, *[ ]t t jE π π+ −  10. In this case, the authorities’ policy choice variables are 
the parameter triplet *1 4{ , , }jγ γ . Parameter *1γ  has to be greater than one to satisfy the stability 
condition that real rates increase in response to expected inflation, with higher values implying a 
more aggressive response11. Parameters 4γ  and j indicate the degree of interest rate smoothing by 
the central bank, and the horizon of the inflation forecast.  
The system of Eqs. (1)-(5) can be expressed compactly as: 
1[ ]t t t tAE X BX CZ+ = +  (6) 
where the (13x1) endogenous variables vector  
                                                 
8 See among others Fama (1981), Conover Jensen and Johnson (1999). 
9 We should point out that McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Orphanides et al (2000) among others, question the 
usual presumption that policymakers can actually observe 
~
ty   when setting it . In an effort to enhance realism in the 
model, we replaced 
~
ty  with 
~
1[ ]t tE y−  in the Taylor rule. The effect of this change on the simulation results, however, 
was quite small, as in McCallum (2001). The results are not presented here, but are available upon request from the 
authors. 
10 In some inflation targeting countries, e.g. United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, actual monetary policy is linked to 
explicit (and often published) inflation forecasts. In other targeting countries though, e.g. Australia, inflation 
forecasts are less explicitly used in policy formulation. See Batini and Haldane (1999) for simulation evidence using 
forward-looking rules in a calibrated model of the UK economy. 
11 Similarly, γ1 has to be greater than zero in Eq. (5) to ensure inflation stabilisation in the Taylor rule. 
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Xt = [ ty  tπ  ti   tq   *tq  
~
ty  1[ ]t tE y +  1[ ]t tE π +  1[ ]t tE π−  1tq −  2tq − 1tπ −  1ti −  ] '   contains eight variables 
non-predetermined at time t, and five predetermined variables (4 lags of endogenous variables 
and  one backward looking expectation).  Zt is a (6x1) vector of exogenous variables containing 
the four stipulated random processes ( tη , tε , tθ , tu ) plus the trend output, 
_
ty , and a constant
12. 
A, B and C represent (13x13), (13x13) and (13x6) matrices of coefficients, respectively. 
 
3. Calibrating the model 
Prior to using stochastic simulations, we need to calibrate the model’s behavioural 
parameters and perform impulse response analysis to ensure the plausibility of the chosen system. 
For the majority of the coefficients, the baseline values presented in Table 1 correspond to 
previous econometric evidence for the United Kingdom, over the inflation targeting period 1992-
2002, by Kontonikas and Montagnoli (2003). Where econometric evidence is not available, the 
parameters are calibrated to ensure plausible dynamic behaviour by the impulse responses.  
     
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In the aggregate demand Eq. (1), the interest rate slope, α1 , is set to 0.4 while the 
elasticity of output with respect to the past level of asset prices, α2 , is 0.1. In Eq. (2), we assume a 
strong effect from the backward-looking component of inflation by setting φ = 0.8, while the 
slope of the Phillips curve, β, is 0.1. The asset price adjustment Eq. (3) allows both for 
‘momentum trading’ and ‘fundamentals pull’ since b1, b2 ≠ 0, with the former effect being rather 
stronger (0.5, as opposed to 0.3). In Eq. (4), the expected output effect on current fundamentals, 
δ2, is assumed to be twice as large as the interest rate effect, δ1, (0.8 as opposed to 0.4).  
The baseline monetary policy rule parameters in Eqs. (5) and (5΄) posit a strong response 
to inflation, expected inflation13 (γ1 = 0.8, γ1* = 3), a mild response to output and asset price 
misalignments (γ2 = γ3 = 0.1), and a high level of interest rate persistence (γ4 = 0.85). The long 
                                                 
12 See Appendix for more technical details. 
13 In the inflation-forecast targeting rule we employ j = 2,  that is we allow for 2 year ahead forecast horizon. This is 
weakly consistent with actual behaviour by the Bank of England, since as Batini and Haldane (1999, p.9) point out,  
“… j defines the feedback horizon under the rule, whereas in practice in the United Kingdom, two years refers to the 
policy horizon (the point at which expected inflation and the inflation target are in line).”  
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run real interest rate, r, is 3.5 %, and the inflation target, π* is set to 2.5 % 14. Finally, the 
autoregressive coefficient of trend output is set to 0.95, implying high persistence, and the 
standard deviations of the random shocks: ση, σθ, σε, σu , σω  are 0.015, 0.003, 0.002, 0.1, 0.006 
respectively (see also McCallum, 2001). This configuration of standard deviations allows asset 
price volatility to exceed output volatility by a factor of about 7, and inflation volatility by a 
factor of 50. Hence, the asset price, via the influence of the shocks to fundamentals, ut, is 
assumed to be the most volatile variable, in line with actual financial market behaviour, while 
inflation is the least volatile variable, capturing the price stability environment in which most 
central banks operate nowadays.  
 
4.1 Impulse response functions 
The results from the theoretical impulse response functions are presented in Figures 1-415. 
Figure 1 plots the responses of output, inflation, interest rate, asset prices to a monetary policy 
shock. Following an increase in interest rates, inflation, output and asset prices decrease, a result 
consistent with a number of VAR studies (see e.g. Thorbecke, 1997). Figure 2 shows the impulse 
responses after a negative supply shock. Output and asset prices decline, while inflation and 
interest rates increase. In the case of positive demand shock (Figure 3), the initial response of all 
four variables is positive. Finally, as Figure 4 indicates, a positive shock in fundamentals leads to 
higher inflation and tighter monetary policy, while the initial impact on output and asset prices is 
positive. In summary, the economic system that we employ appears to be well specified, since we 
establish the presence of a monetary policy transmission mechanism that runs from interest rates 
to output, inflation and asset prices, without  ‘price-puzzle’ in the inflation response, and negative 
effect from inflation to asset prices16.  
              [Figures 1-4 about here] 
4.2 Alternative policy choices  
 We now turn our attention to the focal point of our analysis, that is, what are the welfare 
gains (or losses) when monetary policy chooses to react to asset price misalignments from the 
fundamentals. In the context of our model since there are wealth effects in aggregate demand, 
monetary policy already takes into account asset prices indirectly (and with  lag) by responding to 
                                                 
14 The average nominal interest rate in the United Kingdom over the inflation targeting period 1992:10-2002:01 was 
about 6%.  
15 Figures 1-4 plot the impulse responses for the asset price-augmented Taylor rule case. Similar patterned results, 
available from the authors upon request, were obtained using inflation-forecast targeting monetary policy rule. 
16 See among others, Canova and De Nicolo (1997) for relevant empirical evidence. 
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output movements. The question that then arises is whether an extra direct reaction to deviations 
from fundamentals is stabilizing the economic system or not.  
Bernanke and Gertler’s (1999, 2001) simulation evidence suggests that an aggressive 
inflation-forecast targeting rule ( *1γ  = 3) clearly dominates both ‘accommodative’ rules             
( *1γ  = 1.01), and rules that have been augmented by a variable expressing the level of asset prices. 
They also show that, in agreement with the view that inflation targeting should be applied 
‘flexibly’, policy should also respond to the output gap as well ( 2γ  > 0). Thus, monetary policy 
should respond to movements in asset prices only insofar as they affect the inflation forecast. 
Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky and Wadhwani (2000) reach strikingly different conclusions using 
the same model as Bernanke and Gertler (1999). They suggest that the central bank can reduce 
inflation and output volatility by adjusting interest rates in response to asset price misalignments 
even when inflation remains on track. The differences in their results can be attributed to the 
simulation procedures employed17.  
Representative simulation results using the Taylor rule and inflation forecast-targeting 
rule are shown in Tables 2-3, respectively. The first column of Tables 1-2 presents the response 
of the nominal interest rate to asset price misalignments, *t tq q− . The second to fourth column 
show the unconditional variances (in percentage points) of output, yσ , inflation, πσ , interest 
rates, iσ , and asset prices, qσ . In the absence of discounting, quadratic losses for alternative 
policy rules can be calculated as linear combinations of the unconditional variances of these 
variables: 
y i qL a b c dπσ σ σ σ= + + +                (7) 
where (α, b, c, d) denote the respective weights that the central bank attaches on inflation, output, 
interest rate and asset price volatility18. 
          We consider four alternative sets of weights:  
(α, b, c, d) = (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0), (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1), (1, 1, 0.3, 0), (1, 1, 0.3, 0.1), via which we obtain 
the alternative loss functions L1, L2, L3 and L4 respectively.  L1 and L3 put zero weight on asset 
price volatility, while L2 and L4 penalise asset price volatility with a factor of 0.1. L3 and L4 
                                                 
17 As Bernanke and Gertler (2001) point out, Cecchetti et al (2000) allow only bubble-type shocks to drive asset 
prices and do not take into account the probabilistic structure of the stock market bubble. 
18 We should point out that as McCallum (2001) argues, no actual central bank has yet publicly disclosed an explicit 
objective/loss function and the weights given to each variable. Hence, in analysing the effects of monetary policy 
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correspond to the case of equal weight on inflation and output volatility, while L1 and L2 
recognise price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy, as the weight on inflation 
volatility is double the weight on output volatility. Penalising inflation and output volatility 
reflects a wide agreement that they represent important concerns for monetary policymakers19.  
Inclusion of asset price volatility in L2 and L4 stems from the arguments put forth in Borio and 
Lowe (2002), where it is acknowledged that apart from monetary stability (defined mainly as 
price stability), financial stability is also crucial and should be taken into account explicitly by 
policymakers, since price stability doesn’t necessarily guarantee or promote financial stability.  
All the above specifications penalise instrument (interest rate) volatility with a factor of 0.3 20.  
 
[Tables 2, 3 about here] 
 
 The results in Tables 2, 3 indicate a mild response to asset price misalignments, i.e.         
γ3 = 0.1, is successful in reducing overall macroeconomic volatility using all the alternative loss 
functions and monetary policy rules under investigation. Using both the Taylor rule and the 
inflation-forecast targeting rule, we notice that if the monetary authority reacts too strongly to 
asset prices (γ3 > 0.1), aggregate welfare losses, as indicated by all the loss functions, increase 
due to the higher inflation, output and interest rate volatility, despite the decrease in asset price 
volatility (in the case of L1 and L4 ). Our results differ from the findings of Bernanke and Gertler 
(2001) since, as we show in Table 3, there is an incentive for the central bank to take into account 
asset prices even conditional to a strong response to expected inflation, as the inflation-forecast 
targeting suggests. The differences may derive, among other factors, from the fact that in our 
policy rules we consider asset price deviations from fundamentals, instead of the price of capital 
(Tobin’s q ) as in Bernanke and Gertler.  
The reduction in welfare losses that we obtain with our preferred rule (γ3 = 0.1) derives 
from the lower asset price and output volatility, as compared to the baseline rule (γ3 = 0). The 
increased inflation and interest rate variability has been more than compensated from the sharp 
decreases in output and asset price volatility. For example, in the inflation-forecast targeting case, 
yσ declines from 1.93 to 1.70, and qσ from 10.81 to 10.59.  
                                                                                                                                                              
rules on macroeconomic volatility, McCallum opts for the evaluation of alternative rules that are not necessarily 
derived from optimisation subject to a loss/objective function of the monetary authority.  
19 See for instance the discussion in Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). 
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[Tables 4, 5 about here] 
 
In Tables 4,5 we evaluate the behaviour of the economic system by varying 
simultaneously the parameter responding to inflation ( 1γ , *1γ ) and the parameter associated with 
asset price misalignments ( 3γ ). Specifically, we are postulating two regimes regarding the 
response of interest rates to inflation: an accommodating regime ( 1 0.05γ = , *1 1.05γ = ), and an 
aggressive regime ( 1 2γ = , *1 3γ = ), while with each of the regimes we allow two different values 
of the parameter associated with asset price misalignments: 3 0γ = , and 3 0.1γ = .  In addition, we 
allow for three instances where the parameter associated with the output gap, γ2, assumes a value 
of 0.5. This value was chosen because it was advocated by Taylor (1993) as the appropriate 
response of the central bank to the output gap, independently of its attitude towards inflation. The 
simulation evidence reveals the existence of inflation-output volatility frontiers, since when γ2 
increases from 0 to 0.5, output volatility declines and inflation volatility increases, for any given 
γ1. For instance, in the case of the accommodative rule (first & second row of Table 4) with        
γ3 =0.1, yσ declines from 2.42 to 2.03, while πσ  increases from 1.64 to 2.36.   
When, however, the monetary authority becomes more averse with respect to inflation, 
not only inflation but also output volatility declines in agreement with previous work of 
McCallum (2001). For example, switching from (γ1, γ2, γ3) = (0.05, 0, 0), to   (2, 0, 0) reduces πσ  
by 50 % and yσ  by about 20 %.  Considering the reaction to asset prices, we find that when 
monetary policy responds to misalignments, asset market and output volatility always decline 
leading to lower L’s, conditional upon non-inflation accommodation, i.e. γ1> 0.05. The smallest 
realisations of the alternative loss functions occur at (γ1, γ2, γ3) =  (2, 0.5, 0.1).  
Assuming for simplicity that r = π* = 0, and no interest rate persistence in Eq. (5), the rule 
for operating nominal short term interest rate target, it*, that appears to lead to minimum losses is: 
~
* *3 0.5 0.1( )t t t t ti y q qπ= + + −                 (8) 
where, the differences from the traditional Taylor rule are a much stronger response (twice as 
large) to inflation and an additional mild response to the asset variable. 
                                                                                                                                                              
20 Woodford (1999) provides an incentive for considering instrument volatility by stressing that more variable 
interest rates may undermine the central bank’s credibility.   
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 As we see in Table 5, using the inflation-forecast based rule, there are welfare gains from 
monetary policy reaction to misalignments only when γ1* > 1.05, that is, aggressive inflation-
forecast targeting. The stronger the reaction to expected inflation the greater the reduction in 
macroeconomic volatility. Comparing the last row of Tables 4 and 5 respectively, that correspond 
to the inflation-averse case, we notice that the Taylor rule that includes both asset price 
misalignments and the output gap leads to lower aggregate volatility as compared to the 
augmented (by asset price misalignments) inflation-forecast rule. Hence, we agree with Bernanke 
and Gertler (2001) that inflation targeting should be ‘flexible’ with an independent role for the 
output gap.   
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices using a 
structural model of the economy that allows for the effect of asset prices on aggregate demand. 
The sharp reduction in stock prices on early 2000, and the continuing worldwide increases in 
house prices have resulted in growing interest among academics and policymakers to study the 
links between monetary policy, asset market developments and the real economy. Financial 
imbalances and the economic instability associated with pronounced asset price misalignments 
pose important challenges for monetary policymakers.  Concentrating on price stability alone, as 
a growing number of inflation targeting countries do, is no guarantee that financial instability and 
the serious after-effects of bubbles bursting can be avoided. Taking these arguments into 
consideration, we start from a small scale rational expectations macro model where, in line with 
recent empirical findings and theoretical intuition, the current level of output is positively related 
to lagged real asset prices. In this study, we contribute to the existing literature by employing an 
alternative model for the dynamic evolution of asset prices. We assume that asset prices follow a 
partial adjustment mechanism in the context of which, they are positively affected by past 
changes, while at the same time we also allow for reversion towards their fundamental value.  
Analyzing whether the central bank should take into account asset price misalignments 
when setting interest rates, we consider both the inflation-forecast targeting rule and the standard 
Taylor rule. The main result of our simulations is that a mild response to asset price deviations 
from fundamentals promotes overall macroeconomic stability. This result is robust to all four 
postulated loss functions and policy rules. Monetary policy should not only react strongly to 
inflation (or its forecast) but should also take into account output developments and asset price 
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misalignments. We acknowledge that it may be difficult to interpret asset price movements and 
distinguish between fundamental and non-fundamental components, but the same type of 
uncertainty exists when policy makers are faced with stochastic trend output. Hence, there is 
scope for the monetary authorities to take into account asset price misalignments in the conduct 
of monetary policy despite the measurement errors that they might face.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Using the fact that the asset price Eq. 3 can be re-written as: 
 
*
1 2 1 1 2 2( )t t t tq b b q b q b q− −= − − +               (3)΄ 
 
 Equations (1-5) can be compactly expressed as: 
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The above multivariate linear rational expectations (RE) model is solved in Matlab using 
the generalized Schur form. The core algorithm that we used to calculate numerical solutions is 
solvek.m, whose more detailed analysis may be found in McCallum (1998). It is a modified 
version of the Klein (2000) algorithm. 
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to unit shock to the interest rate. 
0 5 10 15 20
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Output
0 5 10 15 20
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Inflation
0 5 10 15 20
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Interest rate
0 5 10 15 20
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Asset price
 
Figure 2: Impulse responses to unit shock to the inflation rate. 
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to unit shock to the aggregate demand. 
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 Figure 4: Impulse responses to unit shock to the fundamentals. 
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TABLES 
 
 
Table 1: Model Calibration 
 
 
Parameter 
 
1a  0.4 1γ  0.8 
2a  0.1 *1γ  3 
ϕ  0.8 2γ  0.1 
β  0.1 3γ  0.1 
1δ  0.4 4γ  0.85 
2δ  0.8 r  0.035 
1b  0.5 π  0.025 
2b  0.3  
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Table 2: Standard deviations of output, inflation, interest rates, asset prices, using the 
Taylor rule 
 
3γ  yσ  πσ  iσ  qσ  1L  2L  3L  4L  
0 2.13 0.89 0.84 11.06 2.21 3.31 3.27 4.38 
0.1 1.93 0.94 0.83 10.17 2.15 3.17 3.12 4.14 
0.5 1.95 1.45 1.31 8.60 2.79 3.65 3.73 4.59 
1 2.14 2.08 2.11 7.62 3.78 4.55 4.85 5.62 
 
Note: 
(a)  The standard deviations have been calculated using the baseline parameter values from Table 1. 
(b)  L1, L2 , L3 , L4 denote the value of the Loss function, L = aσπ + bσy + cσi + dσq , for (a,b,c,d) = (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0) ,  
     (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1), (1, 1, 0.3, 0), (1, 1, 0.3, 0.1)  respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Standard deviations of output, inflation, interest rates, asset prices, using the 
inflation-forecast targeting rule 
 
3γ  yσ  πσ  iσ  qσ  1L  2L  3L  4L  
0 1.93 0.77 0.82 10.81 1.98 3.06 2.95 4.03 
0.1 1.70 0.84 0.88 10.59 1.95 3.01 2.80 3.86 
0.5 1.74 1.08 1.18 8.81 2.30 3.19 3.17 4.06 
1 1.95 1.39 1.75 7.90 2.89 3.68 3.87 4.66 
 
Note: 
(a)  The standard deviations have been calculated using the parameter values from Table 1. 
(b)  L1, L2 , L3 , L4 denote the value of the Loss function, L = aσπ + bσy + cσi + dσq , for (a,b,c,d) = (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0) , 
     (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1), (1, 1, 0.3, 0), (1, 1, 0.3, 0.1)  respectively.  
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Table 4: Standard deviations of output, inflation, interest rates, asset prices, using the Taylor rule and alternative  
values of 1 2 3( , , )γ γ γ  
 
1 2( , )γ γ  3γ  yσ  πσ  iσ  qσ  1L  2L  3L  4L  
(0.05, 0) 
0 
0.1 
2.51 
2.42 
1.43 
1.64 
0.90 
0.96 
11.04 
10.33 
2.96 
3.14 
4.06 
4.17 
4.21 
4.35 
5.32 
5.38 
(0.05, 0.5) 
0 
0.1 
2.22 
2.03 
1.90 
2.36 
1.20 
1.68 
10.88 
10.20 
3.37 
3.88 
4.46 
4.90 
4.48 
4.89 
5.57 
5.91 
(1, 0) 
0 
0.1 
1.98 
1.82 
0.87 
0.92 
0.92 
0.93 
10.58 
10.08 
2.13 
2.11 
3.19 
3.11 
3.12 
3.02 
4.18 
4.03 
(1, 0.5) 
0 
0.1 
1.78 
1.68 
0.99 
1.03 
0.94 
0.93 
10.53 
10.05 
2.16 
2.14 
3.21 
3.15 
3.04 
2.98 
4.10 
3.99 
(2, 0) 
0 
0.1 
1.99 
1.89 
0.71 
0.73 
1.01 
0.97 
10.68 
10.28 
2.00 
1.97 
3.07 
2.99 
3.00 
2.92 
4.07 
3.95 
(2, 0.5) 
0 
0.1 
1.80 
1.67 
0.75 
0.80 
0.95 
0.94 
10.49 
10.22 
1.93 
1.92 
2.98 
2.95 
2.83 
2.76 
3.88 
3.79 
 
Note: 
(a)  The standard deviations have been calculated using the parameter values from Table 1. 
(b)  L1, L2 , L3 , L4 denote the value of the Loss function, L = aσπ + bσy + cσi + dσq , for (a,b,c,d) = (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0) ,  
     (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1), (1, 1, 0.3, 0), (1, 1, 0.3, 0.1)  respectively. 
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Table 5: Standard deviations of output, inflation, interest rate, asset prices using the inflation-forecast targeting rule  
and alternative values of *1 3( , )γ γ . 
 
*
1γ  3γ  yσ  πσ  iσ  qσ  1L  2L  3L  4L  
1.05 
0 
0.1 
2.66 
2.48 
1.51 
1.77 
0.80 
0.93 
11.47 
10.58 
3.08 
3.28 
4.23 
4.34 
4.41 
4.52 
5.55 
5.58 
2 
0 
0.1 
2.06 
1.85 
0.93 
0.98 
0.82 
0.81 
10.93 
10.20 
2.20 
2.15 
3.29 
3.17 
3.23 
3.07 
4.32 
4.09 
3 
0 
0.1 
1.96 
1.83 
0.77 
0.80 
0.83 
0.84 
10.88 
10.30 
2.00 
1.97 
3.09 
3.00 
2.98 
2.88 
4.07 
3.91 
 
Note: 
(a)  The standard deviations have been calculated using the parameter values from Table 1. 
(b)  L1, L2 , L3 , L4 denote the value of the Loss function, L = aσπ + bσy + cσi + dσq , for (a,b,c,d) = (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0) ,  
     (1, 0.5, 0.3, 0.1), (1, 1, 0.3, 0), (1, 1, 0.3, 0.1)  respectively.  
